Regulatory Oversight of Foreign Clinical Trials: An Examination of the Industry's Influence on FDA Pharmaceutical Regulation and the Implications for Enforcement Activity Both Domestic and Abroad by Kashani, Beeta
Regulatory Oversight of Foreign Clinical Trials: An Examination of the Industry's 
Influence on FDA Pharmaceutical Regulation and the Implications for Enforcement 
Activity Both Domestic and Abroad 
Beeta Kashani (FacultyAdvisor: Gary Reich) 
Political Science 
ABSTRACT 
9: rece:t decadeS; the 
<har=aceutical i:dustry has followed the 
lead of other i:dustries a :d has 
globalized its o<eratio:s. The routi:e 
relocatio: of cli:ical trials to develo<i:g 
cou:tries has c o v e r e d a jurisdictio:al 
ga< betwee: do=estic regulatory 
age:cies a : d i : ter:at io:al = e c h a : i s = s of 
gover:a:ce . This thesis ex<lai:s why 
existi:g regulatio:s gover : i :g 
<har=aceutical cli:ical trials have created 
a regulatory vacuu= i : which ethical 
cli:ical <ractices a :d c o : s u = e r safety are 
u : d e r = i : e d . 9: the case of =ult i :at io :a l 
<har=aceutical co=<a: ies based i : the 
U.S.; 9 show that existi:g global <rotocols 
do : o t adequately address the ethical 
challe:ges created by the globalizatio: of 
cli:ical trials. Meamwhile; the U.S. Food & 
Drug A d = i : i s t r a t i o : also suffers fro= 
regulatory a :d su<ervisory failures due to 
the ability of the <har=aceutical i:dustry 
to effectively ca<ture the age:cy. 
INTRODUCTION 
9: a : i:creasi:gly globalized 
world; it has beco=e =ore a : d =ore 
difficult to e:force health a :d safety 
regulatio:s i : i : ter:at io:al co==erce . 
The ever-cha:gi:g; ever-growi:g global 
e c o : o = y has =itigated the regulatory 
role of the state; leavi:g =atters of 
ethical; e : v i r o : = e : t a l ; a :d legal 
co=<lia:ce to tra :s :at io :a l cor<oratio:s 
to address at will; u : e : c u = b e r e d by 
bureaucratic authority. The 
<har=aceutical i:dustry is o:e of the 
= a : y i:dustries that has be:efitted fro= 
this regulatory void; created by the lack of 
both global sta:dards a : d the syste=atic 
failures of traditio:al regulatory bodies to 
= o : i t o r cli:ical research outside their 
do=estic d o = a i : s . 
The ability to co:duct cli:ical trials 
overseas allows <har=aceutical 
co=<a: ies to circu=ve:t burde:so=e 
ethical <rocedures i : favor of chea<er; 
faster alter:atives. Si:ce 2OO7; twe:ty of 
the largest A = e r i c a : <har=aceutical 
co=<a: ies have based 45% of their 
re<orted trials outside the U:ited States.1 
The : u = b e r of cou:tries servi:g as trial 
sites for cli:ical research has =ore t h a : 
doubled i : the <ast decade. There has 
b e e : wides<read a : d syste=atic ethical 
: o : c o = < l i a : c e o : the <art of the 
researchers who do their fieldwork i : 
<arts of the develo<i:g world; adversely 
affecti:g sta:dards of care; quality of 
i : for=ed co:se:t ; reaso:able availability; 
tra:s<are:cy of drug trials; a :d drug 
i :teractio: effects.2 
9: this thesis; 9 will e x a = i : e why 
existi:g regulatio:s gover : i :g 
<har=aceutical cli:ical trials have created 
1 Seth W . G l i c k = a : , et al. "Ethical a : d S c i e : t i f i c 
9 = p l i c a t i o : s of the G l o b a l i z a t i o : of C l i : i c a l 
Research ." New England Journal of Medicine 36O.8 
(2OO9): 8 1 6 - 2 3 . 
2 Ezekiel E = a : u e l ; D a v i d W e : d l e r ; a : d C h r i s t i : e 
Grady. " W h a t M a k e s C l i : i c a l R e s e a r c h Ethical?" 
JAMA. 283.2O (2OOO): 2 7 O 1 - 2 7 1 1 . 
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a regulatory vacuum in which ethical 
clinical practices and consumer safety are 
undermined. I will examine how the US 
Food & Drug Administration responds to 
the globalization of clinical trials, the 
influence of the pharmaceutical industry 
on research regulation, and the factors 
that contribute to the FDA's regulatory 
and supervisory failures. The first part of 
this thesis will briefly outline the nature 
and ramifications of unethical clinical 
trials in the developing world. I will then 
track the historical development of 
ethical principles guiding human 
experimentation in order to establish the 
context upon which modern day research 
policies are built. Using this foundation, 
the second part of the thesis will analyze 
the role of the FDA in monitoring the 
research activity of the pharmaceutical 
industry, and the relationship between 
the evolution of regulatory practices and 
industry interests. I propose that while 
the FDA has enormous authority and 
control over the drug approval and 
marketing process in the U.S., its efficacy 
in ensuring that ethical research protocol 
is followed abroad and that trial data is 
viable is hampered by industry pressures 
and inadequate coordination with foreign 
regulatory agencies. 
ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN GLOBAL CLINICAL 
RESEARCH 
A majority of individuals enrolled 
as research subjects outside of the U.S. 
live in conditions rife with poverty, 
disease, limited access to healthcare, and 
inadequate education. Because they have 
so few opportunities to pursue their 
financial and physical security, and 
generally lack the knowledge and 
background in healthcare to understand 
the nature of clinical trials, individuals 
commonly feel they are in no position to 
question or negotiate the terms of their 
treatments.3 This often leads research 
subjects to the false assumption that, 
because the researcher is wearing a lab 
coat, they are acting in the patient's best 
interest based on their therapeutic 
obligation as a physician, when in 
actuality they are filling the role of a 
researcher with the primary objective to 
obtain trial data. 4 When one Peruvian 
mother took her sick child to a public 
hospital in Lima, her son received free 
treatment, diapers, and meals, and she 
was urged to sign medical forms even 
though she could not understand them. 
Days later, she found out her son had 
received an experimental therapy. She 
told a reporter, "Nobody said anything 
about it being an experiment. I would 
never have agreed if I had known. I worry 
all the time." 5 
Researchers often assume that 
illiterate subjects are incapable of making 
their own decisions regarding their 
health, so they dehumanize them and 
adopt a paternalistic approach, 
sidestepping the process of obtaining 
informed consent.6 One study showed 
that 90% of the published clinical trials 
conducted in China in 2004 did not report 
ethical review of protocol, and only 18% 
obtained informed consent. 7 Another 
3 Ibid, 8 2 0 . 
4 I leana D o m i n g u e z - U r b a n . " H a r m o n i z a t i o n in the 
Regulat ion of P h a r m a c e u t i c a l R e s e a r c h and 
H u m a n Rights: T h e N e e d to T h i n k Globally." 
Cornell International Law Journal 30 .245 (1997) : 
2 4 5 - 8 6 . 
5 Kel ly Hearn . "The Rise of U n r e g u l a t e d D r u g 
Trials in South A m e r i c a . " The Nation, S e p t e m b e r 
2 1 , 2 0 1 1 . 
6 D i a n a C r a n e . "Sociological Perspect ives on 
R e s e a r c h in H u m a n Populat ions ." Bulletin of the 
World Health Organization 55.2 (1977) : 9 1 - 9 9 . 
7 Dalu Zhang, et al. , "An A s s e s s m e n t of the Qual i ty 
of R a n d o m i z e d Clinical Trials C o n d u c t e d in China ," 
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study demonstrated that when research 
subjects were given food, money, or 
shelter in exchange for their participation, 
they became so reliant on the benefits 
that withdrawing from the study became 
unthinkable, even when they were clearly 
uncomfortable and were legally allowed 
to opt out at any time. 8 Financial 
compensation ultimately takes advantage 
of most subjects' impoverished living 
conditions, essentially forcing them to put 
their own health at risk in the interest of 
accessing the only medical care or 
resources available.9 
In addition to exploiting the 
disadvantaged position of many research 
participants, clinical research is 
disproportionately dedicated to 
conditions that are only of first world 
concern. Conditions of global significance 
— such as malaria, HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, diarrheal diseases, and 
lower respiratory infections — cause the 
majority of premature deaths 
worldwide. 1 0 Yet, the majority of research 
is dedicated to developing treatments for 
more profitable ailments of affluence — 
overactive bladder, allergic rhinitis, and 
acid reflux — which have virtually no 
prevalence in any other part the world. 1 1 
Dr. Jean-Herve Bradol, President of the 
Trials (2008) . 
8 0 . 0 . Ajayi . "Taboos and Clinical R e s e a r c h in W e s t 
Africa ." Journal of Medical Ethics 6 (1980) : 6 1 - 6 3 . 
9 B a r u c h Brody. "Ethical Issues in Clinical Trials in 
D e v e l o p i n g Countr ies . " Biomedical Ethics. By 
T h o m a s A. M a p p e s and David DeGrazia . Boston: 
M c G r a w - H i l l , 2 0 0 6 2 8 4 - 8 8 . 
1 0 W o r l d H e a l t h 0 r g a n i z a t i o n . "The t o p 10 causes 
of death." J u n e 2 0 1 1 . 
< h t t p : / / w w w . w h o . i n t / m e d i a c e n t r e / f a c t s h e e t s / f s 
3 1 0 / e n / i n d e x . h t m l > 
1 1 T e s s a T a n - T o r r e s Edejer . "North-South 
R e s e a r c h P a r t n e r s h i p s : the Ethics of Carrying 0 u t 
R e s e a r c h in D e v e l o p i n g Countries ." British Medical 
Journal 319 (1999) : 4 3 8 - 4 1 . 
French Section of Medicins Sans 
Frontieres, warned of the dire need to 
address the gaps between research 
realities and the global disease burden: 
"In most cases, [the company's] objective 
is not to do research on illnesses affecting 
poor countries." 1 2 Of the 1,556 new drugs 
developed between 1975 and 2004, only 
twenty of them targeted the diseases 
responsible for fifteen million deaths 
annually. Not even 10% of clinical 
research focuses on the conditions that 
cause 90% of deaths worldwide. 1 3 
Not only is foreign clinical 
research often exploitative, it can also be 
scientifically unsound. Because the 
standard of care in the developing world 
is usually second-rate and local facilities 
lack adequate clinical infrastructure, 
health care professionals, and standard 
treatments and drugs, many patients who 
suffer from illnesses are often untreated 
or undertreated. 1 4 When these patients 
participate in a clinical trial, the 
experimental treatment is being tested on 
individuals who have had little to no 
previous exposure to drugs, and thus 
might have an entirely different effect 
than it would on a patient who has been 
medicated, vaccinated, and treated for 
their entire life, as is common in the first 
world. 1 5 These trials do not always take 
into account how the drug would interact 
with other treatments that might be 
administered or present in the 
bloodstream simultaneously, or the effect 
of environmental factors. 1 6 In many cases, 
1 2 J e a n - H e r v e Bradol . "Clinical Trials in Africa: 
Ethical R e s e a r c h N e e d e d on Diseases ," Doctors 
W i t h o u t B o r d e r s , 7 June 2 0 0 7 . W e b . 
1 3 Ibid. 
1 4 G l i c k m a n , "Ethical and Scientific Impl icat ions of 
the Global izat ion of Clinical Research ," 8 1 9 . 
1 5 Ibid , 8 2 0 . 
1 6 F D A Cardiovascular & Renal D r u g s A d v i s o r y 
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attention to social ecology and genetic 
diversity takes a backseat to the 
convenience of the test subjects' lack of 
education or poverty. Researchers have 
found divergence among the genetic 
profiles of populations according to 
geographic location; accordingly, some 
treatments may differ in how they 
respond to the particular genetic makeup 
of different people. 1 7 One study of 42 
genetic variants related to pharmacologic 
response found that more than two-thirds 
had substantial differences in frequency 
between persons of African descent and 
European descent. 1 8 This has serious 
implications for trials involving cardiac, 
circulatory, and neurologic disorders. 1 9 
CASE STUDIES 
In order to illustrate the serious 
implications of the ethical negligence 
routinely exhibited by pharmaceutical 
industry sponsors when conducting 
research, I will describe the clinical 
development of several controversial 
treatments. 
TROVAN 
In 1996, Nigeria experienced the 
largest epidemic of meningococcal 
meningitis 2 0 t h century Africa had ever 
seen. Between January and June of that 
year, 109,580 cases were reported, 
resulting in more than 11,000 deaths. 2 0 
For clinical investigators at the most 
profitable American pharmaceutical 
C o m m i t t e e . 2 0 0 7 M e e t i n g d o c u m e n t s . 
( w w w . f d a . g o v / o h r m s / d o c k e t s / a c / 0 7 / t r a n s c r i p t s 
/ 2 0 0 7 - 4 3 2 7 t - 0 2 - p a r t 2 . p d f ) 
1 7 G l i c k m a n , "Ethical and Scientific Impl icat ions of 
the Global izat ion of Clinical Research ," 8 2 0 . 
1 8 Ibid. 
1 9 Ibid, 8 2 1 . 
2 0 Idris M o h a m m e d , et al . , "A severe e p i d e m i c of 
m e n i n g o c o c c a l meningit is in N i g e r i a , 1996." 
Transactions of the Royal Society of Tropical 
Medicine and Hygiene (2000) : 2 6 5 - 7 0 . 
company, Pfizer, these statistics fell upon 
eager ears. Earlier that year, Pfizer had 
developed a potentially lucrative 
antibiotic called Trovan. Before they 
could make it available on the market, it 
had to be approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration through a process of 
clinical trials and toxicity testing to 
demonstrate the efficacy of the 
treatment. 2 1 To nullify concerns that 
Trovan causes joint damage and other 
dangerous side effects in children, Pfizer 
sought to prove its usefulness to the 
medical community by using it to treat 
bacterial meningitis. However, there were 
not enough cases of meningitis in the 
United States for Pfizer to conduct a 
statistically significant trial. Upon finding 
out about the outbreak across the 
Atlantic, Pfizer promptly opened up an 
unauthorized clinic in the Nigerian city of 
Kano. 2 2 Two hundred children were 
selected from an epidemic hospital; half 
of them were administered an untested 
oral dose of Trovan and the other half 
were given the standard treatment, a dose 
of intravenous ceftriaxone. None of the 
patients' parents were told that their 
children were receiving an experimental 
and potentially risky drug. Although 
Trovan proved fatal for eleven children 
and had detrimental side effects such as 
deafness, lameness, blindness, brain 
damage, and paralysis, Pfizer stated in its 
reports that the death rate was 
significantly low, and never attempted to 
conduct follow up examinations on the 
children to confirm long-term effects of 
2 1 " H o w D r u g s A r e D e v e l o p e d and A p p r o v e d . " U.S. 
F o o d and D r u g A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 23 Apr . 2 0 1 0 . 
W e b . 
2 2 W i l l i a m D u B o i s . " N e w Drug R e s e a r c h , T h e 
Extraterritorial Appl icat ion of F D A R e g u l a t i o n s , 
and the N e e d for International 
Cooperat ion ." VanderbiltJournal of Transnational 
Law 36 .161 (2003) : 1 6 1 - 2 0 7 . 
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the treatment. 2 3 
After FDA approval was obtained 
in the U.S., Trovan was introduced to the 
market in February 1998 as an antibiotic 
with fourteen different uses. That year, 
Trovan was one of Pfizer's top-selling 
drugs, bringing in $160 million and 
expected to bring in $1 billion the 
following year. Within months, reports of 
liver toxicity in patients with Trovan 
prescriptions were submitted to the FDA, 
and the FDA responded by asking Pfizer 
to include liver toxicity in the list of 
possible side effects. The next year 
hundreds of reports of liver problems 
piled in. By the time the FDA issued a 
statement recommending that Trovan be 
used only in hospitals and in rare cases, 
fourteen patients experienced acute liver 
failure, and six died. 2 4 As accusations of 
unethical research practices began to 
crop up in 2000, Pfizer's researchers were 
blamed for not obtaining informed 
consent, keeping inaccurate records, and 
not explaining to the parents of the test 
subjects that their children were 
receiving an experimental and potentially 
risky drug. 2 5 Despite the clear violations 
of research ethics, the deceitful 
exploitation of children during a public 
health emergency, and the lack of 
authorization by the Nigerian 
government, the lawsuit filed against 
Pfizer was dismissed twice in U.S. Courts, 
and a Pfizer spokesman stated that the 
2 3 Ibid, 164. 
2 4 M e l o d y Petersen. "Unforeseen Side Effects 
R u i n e d O n e Blockbuster ." The New York Times. 
A u g u s t 17, 2 0 0 0 . 
< h t t p : / / w w w . n y t i m e s . c o m / 2 0 0 0 / 0 8 / 2 7 / b u s i n e s 
s/unforeseen-s ide-ef fects-ruined-one-
b l o c k b u s t e r . h t m l > 
2 5 Anjal i Kamat , " W i k i L e a k s Cables: Pfizer 
T a r g e t e d Nigerian A t t o r n e y General to U n d e r m i n e 
Suit over Fatal D r u g Tests , " D e m o c r a c y N o w, 17 
Dec. 2 0 1 0 . W e b . 
trials were "sound from medical, 
scientific, regulatory and ethical 
standpoints." 2 6 
SYNFLORIX 
Between 2007 and 2008, 
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) conducted a trial 
in rural areas of Argentina, Colombia, and 
Panama on approximately 24,000 
children between the ages of 6 and 16 
weeks to study the efficacy of a 
pneumococcal vaccine, Synflorix. 2 7 This 
vaccine was developed to prevent both 
pneumococcal diseases, which includes 
meningitis, sepsis, pneumonia, and otitis 
media, as well as bacterial respiratory 
infections. 2 8 Most of the parents of trial 
subjects were under-age, illiterate, or did 
not understand the implications of the 
treatment received. "They are vulnerable 
sections of society," Jorge Yabkowsky, 
president of the Argentine Federation of 
Health Professionals, explained, "They 
were unable to read any kind of consent 
form." 2 9 Researchers received $350 from 
GSK for each subject they enrolled. 3 0 
Fourteen babies who were randomly 
assigned to the placebo group died during 
the trial. 3 1 In 2011, Argentinian courts 
2 6 "Nigeria sues drugs giant Pfizer." BBC News, 5 
J u n e 2 0 0 7 . 
2 7 A n d r e a Gerlin. "Glaxo to A p p e a l Fines in 
A r g e n t i n a Case O v e r Synflorix Trial ." Bloomberg. 
J a n u a r y 3 , 2 0 1 2 . 
< h t t p : / / w w w . b l o o m b e r g . c o m / n e w s / 2 0 1 2 - 0 1 -
03/glaxo-to-appeal- f ines- in-argent ina-case-over-
synflorix-trial .html> 
2 8 "Glaxo m a y not launch Synflorix v a c c i n e in U.S." 
Reuters. F e b r u a r y 5, 2 0 0 9 . 
< h t t p : / / w w w . r e u t e r s . c o m / a r t i c l e / 2 0 0 9 / 0 2 / 0 5 / g 
l a x o - s y n f l o r i x - i d U S L 5 7 7 0 8 5 2 2 0 0 9 0 2 0 5 > 
2 9 " G l a x o S m i t h K l i n e fined over trials on the b a b i e s 
of A r g e n t i n i a n poor ." The Telegraph, 11 J a n u a r y 
2 0 1 2 . 
3 0 Ibid. 
3 1 Natal ie Fuertes . " W o r l d Report : G S K 
malpract ice case raises quest ions about trial 
s tandards ." The Lancet. 379 (2012) : 508. 
< h t t p : / / w w w . i a p c o i . c o m / h p / p d f / G S K % 2 0 m a l p r a 
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sued GSK $92,000 for "administrative 
irregularities" in obtaining informed 
consent. GSK is currently in the process of 
appealing the decision, claiming they 
"[conduct] clinical trials to the same high 
standards irrespective of where in the 
world they are run." 
KETEK 
In the 1990s, French company 
Aventis Pharmaceuticals (later Sanofi-
Aventis) began conducting clinical trials 
of a new antibiotic, Ketek (telithromycin), 
developed to treat bacterial respiratory 
infections such as sinusitis, bronchitis, 
and pneumonia. 3 2 Most of the trials were 
done in Hungary, Morocco, Tunisia, and 
Turkey. 3 3 Several weeks before FDA 
approval of Ketek, an American 
researcher who had enrolled more than 
400 subjects in one of Ketek's key clinical 
trials was sentenced to 57 months in 
prison for fabricating 9 1 % of her trial 
data. 3 4 It was later revealed that she 
collected $400 from Aventis for every 
subject she enrolled. Even after her 
sentencing, the FDA approved Ketek as 
safe in 2004, primarily based on foreign 
clinical data, and it was introduced to the 
market. 3 5 
By 2006, the FDA received 
fourteen reports of liver failure, 23 
reports of serious liver injury, and 
numerous other reports of liver damage, 
c t i c e % 2 0 c a s e % 2 0 r a i s e s % 2 0 q u e s t i o n s % 2 0 a b o u t 
0 /o20trial°/o20standards.pdf> 
3 2 K D Clay, JS H a n s o n , SD Pope , R W Rissmiller , et 
al. "Brief c o m m u n i c a t i o n : severe hepatotoxic i ty of 
te l i thromycin: three case reports and l iterature 
review." Annuals of Internal Medicine 144.6 
(2006) : 4 1 5 - 2 0 . 
< h t t p : / / w w w . n c b i . n l m . n i h . g o v / p u b m e d / 1 6 4 8 1 4 5 
1> 
3 3 D o n a l d L. Barlett and J a m e s B. Steele . " D e a d l y 
Medic ine ." Vanity Fair, J a n u a r y 2 0 1 1 . 
3 4 H e a r n , "The Rise of U n r e g u l a t e d D r u g Trials in 
South A m e r i c a . " 
3 5 Ibid. 
including four deaths. 3 6 A study done that 
same year examined three previously 
healthy patients who had taken 
Telithromycin. Within days, all three of 
the patients had acute hepatitis, jaundice, 
and "markedly abnormal results on liver 
function tests." 3 7 One of the patients 
recovered, one needed orthotropic liver 
transplantation, and the third died. 
Further examination of the second and 
third patients revealed "massive hepatic 
necrosis," or the premature death of cells 
in living tissue. 3 8 Dr. David Graham wrote 
an email in 2006, obtained by the New 
York :i;es, revealing he thought 
approving Ketek was a mistake and 
strongly advised its withdrawal. He 
explained, "We don't really know if the 
drug works; no one is claiming it works 
better than other, safer drugs; and we're 
flying blind as far as safety goes, except 
for our own A.D.R. data that suggests 
telithromycin is uniquely more toxic than 
most other drugs." 3 9 He went on to write, 
"For FDA to refer to its being assured by 
post-marketing data from Latin America 
and Europe as a basis for declaring 'Ketek 
is safe' is in my opinion a great abuse of 
such surveillance data." Several weeks 
after these emails were made public, the 
FDA added to Ketek's warning section to 
include adverse events such as "visual 
disturbances, loss of consciousness, and 
hepatic toxicity." 4 0 
3 6 G a r d i n e r Harris . " A p p r o v a l of Antibiot ic 
W o r r i e d Safety Officials." :<e New York :imes. 
2006. < 
h t t p : / / w w w . n y t i m e s . c o m / 2 0 0 6 / 0 7 / 1 9 / h e a l t h d 1 
9fda .html?_r=1> 
3 7 C lay , "Brief c o m m u n i c a t i o n . " 
3 8 Ibid. 
3 9 Harr is , "Approval of Antibiot ic W o r r i e d Safety 
Officials." 
4 0 F o o d & D r u g A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . "FDA A n n o u n c e s 
Label and Indication C h a n g e s for the Antibiot ic 
Ketek." F e b r u a r y 1 2 , 2 0 0 7 . 
< h t t p : / / w w w . f d a . g o v / N e w s E v e n t s / N e w s r o o m / P r 
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It was not until February 2007, 
when more than 5 million Ketek 
prescriptions had been written, that the 
FDA announced that Sanofi-Aventis had 
to include a black box warning with the 
medication, as well as a Patient 
Medication Guide, and restrict its use for 
two previously approved conditions -
acute bacterial sinusitis and acute 
bacterial bronchitis. 4 1 For these 
conditions, the FDA concluded that the 
risks of Ketek greatly outweighed the 
potential benefits. Iowan Senator Charles 
Grassley, a chairman of the Finance 
Committee who was involved in 
investigating Ketek, said, "It's no surprise 
to learn that the F.D.A. didn't listen to Dr. 
Graham on the dangers of Ketek. The 
F.D.A. has made it their business to 
discredit Dr. Graham and others who 
aren't willing to cater to the drug 
companies." 4 2 
DEVELOPMENT OF GLOBAL STANDARDS 
In the past century, international 
efforts have been made to develop global 
standards of conduct for human 
experimentation. Current regulations for 
clinical research are derived from a series 
of international documents that form the 
foundation of research ethics. In this 
section, I will outline the historical 
contexts, important contributions, and 
fundamental gaps of each of these 
international documents to demonstrate 
why they fail to complement national 
regulations by reining in the 
pharmaceutical industry on a global scale. 
e s s A n n o u n c e m e n t s / 2 0 0 7 / u c m 1 0 8 8 4 2 . h t m ? u t m _ c 
a m p a i g n = G o o g l e 2 & u t m _ s o u r c e = f d a S e a r c h & u t m _ 
m e d i u m = w e b s i t e & u t m _ t e r m = k e t e k & u t m _ c o n t e n t 
=2> 
4 1 Ibid. 
4 2 Harris , "Approval of Antibiot ic W o r r i e d Safety 
Officials." 
Before World War II, no universal 
ethical document existed to guide 
research involving humans. When Allied 
troops moved to liberate Nazi 
concentration camps, they were horrified 
to discover that scores of prisoners had 
been subjected to ghastly medical 
experiments, carried out by Nazi 
researchers in an attempt to test the 
limits of the human body, develop 
weapons of warfare, and test 
experimental antibiotics. None of the 
prisoners gave consent or willingly 
volunteered to be exposed to diseases 
such as malaria, jaundice, and typhus, or 
to be operated on in a variety of 
dangerous surgical procedures. 4 3 
The subsequent Doctors' Trial 
(United States of America v. Karl Brandt, 
et al.), the first of twelve trials for war 
crimes held by American authorities 
before American military courts in 
Nuremberg between October 1946 and 
August 1947, illuminated the dire need 
for an international consensus on 
bioethics. 4 4 Of the twenty-three 
defendants, twenty were medical doctors 
charged with crimes against humanity, 
such as performing medical experiments 
without the subjects' consent on 
prisoners of war and civilians of occupied 
countries. 4 5 Sixteen of the accused were 
4 3 M a t t h e w L i p p m a n . "The Nazi Doctors Trial and 
the International Prohibi t ion on M e d i c a l 
I n v o l v e m e n t in T o r t u r e . " L o y o l a of Los Angeles 
International and Comparative Law Journal 15.2 
(1993) : 3 9 5 - 4 4 1 . 
4 4 U n i t e d States of A m e r i c a v s . Karl B r a n d t , et al. 
1946. 
4 5 O p e n i n g S t a t e m e n t of the P r o s e c u t i o n b y 
Brigadier G e n e r a l Teleford T a y l o r , 9 D e c e m b e r 
1946. 
< h t t p : / / w w w . m a z a l . o r g / a r c h i v e / n m t / 0 1 / N M T 0 1 
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indicted and sentenced to execution or 
imprisonment, despite their protests that 
there was no law that differentiated 
between legal and illegal human 
experiments. 4 6 In response, Dr. Leo 
Alexander, an American physician and 
medical advisor to the trials, proposed a 
set of principles to define legitimate and 
ethical medical research. Four more 
principles were added and adopted by the 
trial verdict, creating the Nuremberg 
Code. 
This code was the first established 
set of ethical principles for research 
involving human beings and prompted 
international dialogue regarding the 
development of international standards 
for research on humans. It emphasized, 
above all, informed and voluntary 
consent, as well as the absence of physical 
and mental suffering of the patient, an 
analysis of risks and benefits, scientific 
validity, and beneficence of the 
researcher with regards to the subject. 4 7 
However, as the interest in medical 
research and advancement of new 
research methods grew, the need for 
more developed guidelines grew as well. 
Physician-researchers found that the 
Nuremberg Code was too stringent and 
inflexible and hindered their research. It 
made no provisions or guidelines dealing 
with children or the mentally impaired as 
research subjects and overemphasized 
4 6 Federal R e s e a r c h Division. L ibrary of Congress . 
"Trials of W a r Criminals Before the N u r e m b e r g 
Mil itary Tr ibunals U n d e r Control Counci l Law." 
O c t o b e r 1 9 4 6 - Apri l 1 9 4 9 . 
< h t t p : / / w w w . l o c . g o v / r r / f r d / M i l i t a r y _ L a w / N T s _ w 
ar-cr iminals .html> 
4 7 Ibid. 
informed consent. 4 8 
In 1964, the World Medical 
Association presented the Declaration of 
Helsinki. Rather than a list of 
uncompromising principles, the 
Declaration was intended to be a more 
versatile ethical model, which would 
serve as guidelines for physicians. 
American researcher Henry Beecher 
explained: "The Nuremberg Code 
presents a rigid act of legalistic 
demands... The Declaration of Helsinki on 
the other hand, presents a set of guides. It 
is an ethical as opposed to a legalistic 
document and is thus more broadly useful 
than the one formulated at Nuremberg." 4 9 
The President of the Council for 
International Organizations of Medical 
Sciences (CIOMS) stated that the 
Declaration of Helsinki improved upon 
the Nuremberg Code's "circumstantial" 
guidelines by placing them "more 
correctly in the context of generally 
accepted medical traditions." 5 0 
The Declaration accomplished this 
versatility by isolating therapeutic and 
non-therapeutic, or scientific, research. 5 1 
4 8 G e o r g e J. A n n a s . "The C h a n g i n g L a n d s c a p e of 
H u m a n E x p e r i m e n t a t i o n : N u r e m b e r g , Helsinki , 
and b e y o n d . " Journal of Law and Medicine 92.2 
(1992) : 119. 
< h t t p : / / c o n n e c t i o n . e b s c o h o s t . c o m / c / a r t i c l e s / 9 6 0 
9 0 4 2 7 0 3 / c h a n g i n g - l a n d s c a p e - h u m a n -
e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n - n u r e m b e r g - h e l s i n k i - b e y o n d > 
4 9 Q u o t e d in W . R e f s h a u g e , T h e Place for 
International S t a n d a r d s in C o n d u c t i n g R e s e a r c h 
for H u m a n s , 55 Bull . W o r l d Health Org. 133-35 
(Supp. 1977) 
5 0 R e f s h a u g e , supra note 5, at 137. 
5 1 A n n a s , "The C h a n g i n g L a n d s c a p e of H u m a n 
E x p e r i m e n t a t i o n : N u r e m b e r g , Hels inki , and 
b e y o n d . " 
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While therapeutic research is utilized 
strictly for the benefit of the patient, 
scientific research is done to acquire 
scientific data. The patient's consent is 
valued differently according to which 
type of research they are exposed: if it is 
therapeutic, the physician may make 
decisions for the patient without their 
consent, assuming that the physician has 
the patient's best interests in mind. It was 
thought that acquiring consent in these 
instances would be too cumbersome and 
would create unnecessary difficulty in 
caring for the patient. 5 2 If the patient is 
involved in scientific research, their 
complete informed consent is absolutely 
necessary because there may be no direct 
benefit to the patient at all . 5 3 But when it 
comes to types of research like drug trials, 
they may be difficult to label as strictly 
therapeutic or scientific. Experimental 
treatments may be given in a therapeutic 
treatment, but they may not be proven to 
be safe or effective and are therefore not 
expected to necessarily benefit the 
patient. 5 4 In the 1975 revision, another 
provision was added, pushing for formal 
peer review of research protocols, which 
would give institutional review boards 
the responsibility to consider and 
comment on proposed experimental 
procedures. 5 5 
During the 1990s, a series of trials 
were conducted in developing countries 
that incited international controversy and 
illustrated serious deficiencies in the 
5 2 D a w n Joyce Miller. "Research and 
Accountabi l i ty : T h e N e e d for U n i f o r m Regulat ion 
of International P h a r m a c e u t i c a l Drug Testing." 
Pace International Law Review 13 (2001) : 204. 
5 3 Ibid, 204. 
5 4 Ib id , 204. 
5 5 A n n a s , "The C h a n g i n g L a n d s c a p e of H u m a n 
E x p e r i m e n t a t i o n : N u r e m b e r g , Helsinki , and 
b e y o n d . " 
newly revised global standards. In 1994, 
trials were conducted in Uganda to 
determine if zidovudine (AZT), an 
antiretroviral drug, would decrease the 
likelihood of mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV. Researchers found 
that administering the drug during 
pregnancy and labor reduced 
transmission to infants by two-thirds, and 
that it had the potential to save one out of 
every seven infants born to HIV-positive 
women. 5 6 These studies proved to be 
controversial because a number of study 
participants were randomly assigned to 
placebo control groups. Although the use 
of placebos allows for quicker and more 
accurate results than equivalency studies, 
which are done to determine efficacy of a 
treatment in comparison to a pre-
established level of efficacy, it deprives 
those unfortunate enough to be 
randomized into the control group of any 
kind of treatment, even if one exists. 5 7 
Placebo-controlled studies were justified 
because research subjects were not being 
denied a treatment they would have 
otherwise received. This logic proved to 
be problematic because it created an 
incentive for researchers to conduct 
studies in parts of the world with the least 
access to medical care, where locals 
would more willingly risk being put into 
the placebo group out of desperation for 
5 6 Peter Lurie, S i d ney M. W o l f e . "Unethical Trials 
of Intervent ions to R e d u c e Perinatal T r a n s m i s s i o n 
of the H u m a n I m m u n o d e f i c i e n c y Virus in 
D e v e l o p i n g Countr ies . " New England Journal of 
Medicine 337 ( 1 9 9 7 ) : 8 5 3 - 8 5 6 . 
< h t t p : / / w w w . n e j m . o r g / d o i / f u l l / 1 0 . 1 0 5 6 / N E J M 1 
9 9 7 0 9 1 8 3 3 7 1 2 1 2 > 
5 7 B r o o k s J a c k s o n , et al. " I n t r a p a r t u m and neonata l 
s ingle-dose nevirapine c o m p a r e d with z i d o v u d i n e 
for p r e v e n t i o n of mother-to-chi ld t r a n s m i s s i o n of 
HIV-1 in K a m p a l a , U g a n d a . " The Lancet 362 
(2003) : 8 5 9 - 8 6 8 . 
< h t t p : / / w w w . t h e l a n c e t . c o m / j o u r n a l s / l a n c e t / a r t i 
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even a 50% chance of receiving 
treatment. 
Following these incidents, the 
Declaration's revisions in 2000 contained 
a provision that stated, "A new method 
should be tested against those of the best 
current prophylactic, dialogistic, and 
therapeutic methods," and that a placebo 
(no treatment) is acceptable only in cases 
where no proven method exists. 5 8 
Another provision stated that all study 
participants, on the completion of a 
clinical trial, must be provided with the 
"best proven diagnostic and therapeutic 
methods." 5 9 Before the codification of this 
principle, most research participants in 
the developing world were not provided 
with the proven treatment after the 
conclusion of the study, while 
participants in wealthy countries were 
supplied with the proven treatment until 
their death or the end of their illness. 
Although these provisions were well 
intentioned, they failed to fully address 
the root problems. The banning of 
placebos or experimental treatments 
when a proven treatment already exists is 
meant to promote a global standard of 
care, granting every trial subject the same 
treatment they would have received 
anywhere else in the world. This principle 
does not consider the extremely high cost, 
sophisticated equipment, and advanced 
medical training that is necessary to 
provide many standard treatments or 
perform standard procedures. Thus, it 
effectively bans the development of more 
practical treatments that would be 
cheaper and easier to implement or 
administer in the less advanced 
5 8 W o r l d M e d i c a l Associat ion . "Declaration of 
Helsinki : ethical principles for medica l research 
involving h u m a n subjects ." Journal of 
Postgraduate Medicine 4 8 . 2 0 6 (2002) . 
5 9 D i s m a n t l i n g the Helsinki Declarat ion 30 , 2 0 0 3 . 
healthcare systems of developing 
countries. 6 0 
In 1949, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) founded 
the Council of International Organizations 
of Medical Sciences (CIOMS), an 
international non-governmental 
organization designated to maintain 
"collaborative relations" with the UN, 
UNESCO, and WHO. In the late 1970s, 
CIOMS and WHO teamed up to establish 
bioethics as an integral part of medical 
research. They sought to develop an 
ethical framework "to indicate how the 
ethical principles that should guide the 
conduct of biomedical research involving 
human subjects, as set forth in the 
Declaration of Helsinki, could be 
effectively applied, particularly in 
developing countries, given their 
socioeconomic circumstances, laws and 
regulations, and executive and 
administrative arrangements." 6 1 In 1982, 
WHO and CIOMS published International 
Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research 
Involving Human Subjects. 
The document is intended to guide 
research that involves human subjects, 
which includes "studies of a physiological, 
biochemical or pathological process; the 
response to a specific intervention... in 
healthy subjects or patients; controlled 
trials of diagnostic preventative, or 
6 0 David W e n d l e r and EJ E m a n u e l . "The S t a n d a r d 
of Care D e b a t e : Can R e s e a r c h in D e v e l o p i n g 
Countr ies be Both Ethical and R e s p o n s i v e to 
T h o s e Countr ies ' Health n e e d s ? " American Journal 
of Public Health 94.6 (2004) : 9 2 3 - 9 2 8 . 
6 1 Counci l for Internat ional O r g a n i z a t i o n s of 
M e d i c a l Sc iences in col laborat ion w i t h the W o r l d 
Health O r g a n i z a t i o n . " International Ethical 
Guidel ines for B i o m e d i c a l R e s e a r c h Involving 
H u m a n Subjects ." Geneva , 2 0 0 2 . 
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therapeutic measures; studies designed to 
determine the consequences of specific 
preventative or therapeutic measures; 
studies concerning health-related 
behavior". 6 2 The guidelines call for 
research to adhere to basic principles: 1) 
respect for persons: respect for autonomy 
and protection of those with impaired 
autonomy; 2) beneficence: the obligation 
to maximize benefit and minimize harm; 
3) justice: the treatment of each 
individual subject with the utmost respect 
and dignity, the equal distribution of 
burdens and benefits between those 
involved in the research, and sensitivity 
to the specific needs of subjects. 6 3 
Research protocol should clearly 
elucidate "the aim of the research; the 
reasons for proposing that it involve 
human subjects; the nature and degree of 
any known risks to the subjects; the 
sources from which it is proposed to 
recruit subjects; and the means proposed 
for ensuring that subjects' consent will be 
adequately informed ad voluntary", and 
the protocol should be scientifically and 
ethically reviewed by independent 
investigative bodies. 6 4 
However, due to the spread of 
HIV/AIDS, biotechnological 
advancements, and new research 
practices, CIOMS was obligated to publish 
two revisions: International Guidelines for 
Ethical Review of Epidemiological Studies 
(1991), and International Ethical 
Guidelines for Biomedical Research 
Involving Human Subjects (1993). Ethical 
issues that arose after 1993 exposed gaps 
in the revisions that were connected to 
clinical trials done in developing 
countries. Some argued for local decision-
6 2 Ibid, 19. 
6 3 Ibid, 18. 
6 4 Ibid, 18. 
making, the avoidance of paternalism, and 
the development of low-cost public health 
solutions in communities where research 
was done. After much deliberation and re¬ 
drafting, CIOMS published the latest 
revision in 2002, which is comprised of 
general ethical principles and twenty-one 
guidelines. Just like the first draft, the 
current document is intended "to be of 
use, particularly to low-resource 
countries, in defining national policies on 
the ethics of biomedical research, 
applying ethical standards in local 
circumstances, and establishing or 
redefining adequate mechanisms for 
ethical review of research involving 
human subjects." 
The actual guidelines and their 
respective detailed commentaries consist 
of rules such as ethical justification and 
scientific validity of biomedical research 
involving human beings, ethical review 
committees, ethical review of externally 
sponsored research in the country 
sponsoring the research, individual 
informed consent, obligations of sponsors 
and investigators, benefits and risks of 
study participation, choice of control 
treatment, equitable distribution of risks 
and benefits, research on children, right 
of injured subjects to treatment and 
compensation, and more. 6 5 
At the 2001 Conference on Ethical 
Aspects of Research in Developing 
Countries, participants compiled a set of 
developed criticisms of the CIOMS 
guidelines. In particular, they focused on 
the idea of reasonable availability, 
explained in Guideline 10: "The sponsor 
and investigator must make every effort 
to ensure that: 1) the research is 
responsive to the health needs and the 
6 5 Ibid, 2 5 - 8 2 . 
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priorities of the population or community 
in which it is to be carried out; and 2) any 
intervention or product developed or 
knowledge generated, will be made 
reasonably available for the benefit of 
that population or community." 6 6 This 
guideline was criticized because of its 
reliance on a "mistaken conception" of 
exploitation - it focuses on the products 
of the research rather than the level of 
benefit. 6 7 While benefits are provided (i.e. 
"the fruits of the research"), they may not 
be necessarily fair or appropriate for the 
community. 6 8 
Reasonable availability not only 
"embodies a very narrow notion of 
benefits," it makes the benefit reliant 
upon the success of the clinical trial, 
ignoring other potential benefits such as 
"the training of health care or research 
personnel, the construction of health care 
facilities and other physical 
infrastructure, and the provision of public 
health measures and services beyond 
those required by the research trial." 6 9 
Furthermore, it is not applicable to Phase 
I and II drug and vaccine testing, or to 
genetic, epidemiology, and natural history 
research. 7 0 The Conference ultimately 
contributed a few constructive 
recommendations, including "providing 
collateral health services unnecessary for 
the research itself; public health 
measures for the country or community; 
long-term research collaboration; and 
sharing of financial rewards from 
research results, including intellectual 
6 6 Ibid, 51 . 
6 7 2 0 01 C o n f e r e n c e on Ethical A s p e c t s of R e s e a r c h 
in D e v e l o p i n g Countr ies . "Moral S t a n d a r d s for 
R e s e a r c h in D e v e l o p i n g Countries ." Hast ings 
Center Report . ( 2 0 0 4 ) : 17. 
6 8 Ibid, 19. 
6 9 Ib id , 21 . 
7 0 Ib id , 21 . 
property rights", as well as advocate for 
transparency of the research process, 
extensive deliberative dialogue with the 
subject community, and a publicly 
available record of research protocol and 
benefit agreements. 7 1 
Existing international guidelines 
have had a global impact. The Nuremberg 
Code set the precedent for an 
internationally accepted set of bioethical 
principles to guide human 
experimentation. The Declaration of 
Helsinki has been characterized as the 
"cornerstone of biomedical research for 
the past 30 years" and the indisputable 
foundation for ethical decision-making in 
research. 7 2 The CIOMS guidelines 
proposed suggestions for the application 
of ethical principles specifically for 
research conducted in developing 
countries. Although none of these ethical 
guidelines are legally binding under 
international law, they have in some part 
influenced or been integrated into 
numerous international, regional, and 
national legislation on human 
experimentation.7 3 The Code of Federal 
Regulations, consisting of guidelines 
directing federally funded research in the 
U.S., is partly based on the Nuremberg 
Code. 7 4 In 1981, the U.S. Courts cited the 
Nuremberg Code when stating, "The 
7 1 Ruth Mackl in . Double Standards in Medical 
Research in Developing Countries. C a m b r i d g e 
Universi ty Press . (2004) : 152. 
7 2 Francis C r a w l e y & J o s e p h Hoet. Ethics and Law: 
The Declaration of Helsinki Under Discussion. 150 
Bulletin of M e d i c a l Ethics 9.10: (1999) . 
7 3 Delon H u m a n and Sev S. Fluss . "The W o r l d 
M e d i c a l Associat ion's Declarat ion of Helsinki : 
Historical and C o n t e m p o r a r y Perspect ives ." 2 0 0 1 . 
< h t t p : / / w w w . w m a . n e t / e n / 2 0 a c t i v i t i e s / 1 0 e t h i c s / 
10hels inki/draft_histor ica l_contemporary_perspe 
ctives.pdfg 
7 4 Protect ion of H u m a n Subjects , 45 C.F.R. § 46 
(2009) . 
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international consensus against 
involuntary human experimentation is 
clear." 7 5 The Belmont Report, the 
foundation of the Food & Drug 
Administration's duties and functions, is 
based on the Declaration of Helsinki. 
While all have been widely accepted and 
recognized worldwide, they have been 
criticized for being devised in reaction to 
particular events, such as the Nazi 
experiments or the Tuskegee and 
Willowbrook scandals . 7 6 , 7 7 , 7 8 As a result, 
they inadequately or unevenly address 
certain principles according to the context 
of the document's conception: the 
Nuremberg Code relies too much on 
informed consent, while the Declaration 
is too ambiguous to allow for pragmatic 
application, and CIOMS does not fully 
address the needs of research 
participants from the developing world. 
Furthermore, the guidelines are almost 
entirely oriented towards the "integrity 
and judgment" of the researcher, and 
have no real methods of enforcement.7 9 
7 5 United States v. Jaffe, 663 F.2d 1226 
<http: / / l a w . j u s t i a . c o m / c a s e s / f e d e r a l / a p p e l l a t e -
c o u r t s / F 2 / 6 6 3 / 1 2 2 6 / 1 4 7 0 5 6 / > 
7 6 E m a n u e l , " W h a t M a k e s Clinical R e s e a r c h 
Ethical?" 2 7 0 2 . 
7 7 T h e T u s k e g e e syphil is e x p e r i m e n t w a s a 4 0 -
y e a r - l o n g study c o n d u c t e d b y the Public Health 
Service to observe and record the p r o g r e s s i o n of 
syphil is in Afr ican A m e r i c a n m e n , w h o w e r e never 
i n f o r m e d of the real p u r p o s e of the study and 
w e r e deprived of effective t r e a t m e n t , penici l l in , 
even w h e n it b e c a m e available in 1947. See "The 
T u s k e g e e T i m e l i n e , " Centers for D i s e a s e Control 
and Prevent ion . 2 0 1 1 . 
7 8 B e t w e e n 1 9 5 6 and 1970, s tudents h o u s e d at 
W i l l o w b r o o k State S c h o o l , a g o v e r n m e n t - f u n d e d 
school for chi ldren with intel lectual disabil i t ies , 
w e r e intentional ly infected with the hepatit is 
v irus in order to help r e s e a r c h e r s develop a 
vacc ine . See Medical Ethics and Humanities b y 
Frederick Paola, et al. (Jones & Bartlett Learning, 
2 0 1 0 ) . P a g e s 2 8 5 - 2 8 6 . 
7 9 D o m i n g u e z - U r b a n , " H a r m o n i z a t i o n in the 
The inability of global standards to 
act as effective regulatory mechanisms for 
foreign clinical trials place the burden of 
supervision on states. 
T H E ROLE OF THE F D A 
In 1938, U.S. Congress passed the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). 8 0 
This law gave the Food and Drug 
Administration the responsibility to 
guarantee: the safety and efficacy of 
human and veterinary drugs and medical 
devices, safety and proper labeling of food 
and cosmetics, and protection of public 
health from electronic product 
radiation. 8 1 The FDA is mandated to 
protect public health through product 
regulation and supervision. The FDCA 
endows the FDA with the authority to 
inspect and approve new drugs and 
medical devices before they may be made 
available to the public, including the 
clinical trials required to develop them, as 
well as the duty to promptly withdraw a 
product if it proves to be unsafe after 
being introduced to the market. FDA 
restrictions apply to: research involving 
human subjects that is conducted, funded, 
or bound to regulation by any federal 
agency, as well as research conducted, 
funded, or bound to regulation by the 
federal government outside the U.S. 8 2 
Research that is not conducted or funded 
by the federal government, but subject to 
federal regulations, is required to be 
evaluated and given approval by an 
institutional review board according to 
Regulat ion of P h a r m a c e u t i c a l R e s e a r c h and 
H u m a n Rights: T h e N e e d to T h i n k Globally," 274. 
8 0 Federal F o o d , D r u g , and C o s m e t i c A c t of 1 9 3 8 , 
21 U.S.C. C h a p t e r 9. 
8 1 F o o d and D r u g A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 21 U.S.C. § 
3 9 3 ( b ) ( 2 0 0 9 ) . 
8 2 Protect ion of H u m a n Subjects , 45 C.F.R. § 4 6 . 1 0 1 
(2009) . 
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the same regulations. 8 3 Because all drugs 
must be approved by the FDA before 
being introduced into U.S. markets, any 
pharmaceutical corporations that conduct 
clinical trials to develop drugs to sell in 
the U.S. fall under the umbrella of 
restrictions as put forth by the Code of 
Federal Regulations. 
The National Commission for the 
Protection of Human Subjects of 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 
established after the Tuskegee Syphilis 
scandal, was Congressionally mandated in 
1974 to investigate all federally 
sponsored human subject research and 
review ethical research principles. The 
most prominent of their published 
reports is the Belmont Report, which is 
based on the Declaration of Helsinki and 
focused on three basic principles -
respect for persons, beneficence, and 
justice - which were then applied to 
modern FDA research regulations. 8 4 , 8 5 
"Respect for persons" is actualized 
through the rule of informed consent. The 
FDA requires that research may be done 
only under the condition that "the legally 
effective informed consent of the subject 
or the subject's legally authorized 
representative" is obtained. 8 6 Informed 
consent is defined as disclosing to the 
patient information regarding the study's 
purposes and methodology, potential 
8 3 Ibid. 
8 4 David P e r l m a n . "Ethics in Clinical Research: A 
History of H u m a n Subject Protect ions and 
Practical I m p l e m e n t a t i o n of Ethical S t a n d a r d s . " 
T e m p l e Universi ty School of P h a r m a c y . 2004. 
< h t t p : / / w w w . s o c r a . o r g / p d f / 2 0 0 4 0 5 _ E t h i c s _ C l i n i c 
a l _ R e s e a r c h _ H i s t o r y . p d f ] 
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xbenef i t 
8 6 G e n e r a l R e q u i r e m e n t s for I n f o r m e d Consent , 21 
C.F.R. § 50.20 ( 1 9 9 9 ) . 
risks and intended benefits, other 
alternative treatments, and the patient's 
right to withdraw from the study at any 
time, presented in a way the patient can 
understand. 8 7 The patient may not be 
coerced in any way. Informed consent 
may be bypassed only if the physician 
demonstrates that the patient was in a life 
threatening situation, the patient was 
unable to give consent, there was no time 
to obtain consent from another legitimate 
source, and there are no alternative 
treatments available. 8 8 
"Beneficence" involves respecting 
the integrity and autonomy of the 
individual, as well as promoting their well 
being and protecting them from harm. 
This principle is the basis of the 
researcher's obligation to maximize 
benefits and minimize harm to the study 
participants. A clinical trial may only be 
conducted if it is supported by a positive 
risk/benefit analysis and the subject is 
not exposed to an unreasonable level of 
risk. "Justice" involves the equitable 
distribution of research benefits and 
burdens, and calls for a fair and 
appropriate method of selecting research 
subjects. This principle gives rise to the 
researcher's responsibility to select 
research populations based on the 
relevance of the study to their specific 
conditions, and to avoid taking advantage 
of economic, social, racial, or sexual 
vulnerabilities. 
These three principles are fulfilled 
by research protocol inspection by 
institutional review boards (IRB). IRBs, 
also called independent ethics 
committees or ethical review boards, are 
8 7 E l e m e n t s of I n f o r m e d Consent , 21 C.F.R. § 50.25 
(2011) . 
8 8 Except ion from G e n e r a l R e q u i r e m e n t s , 21 C.F.R. 
§ 50.23 (2011) . 
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committees officially assigned by the FDA 
to review biomedical research proposals, 
approve, disapprove, or require 
modification of research protocol, and 
monitor clinical trials involving humans. 
IRBs provide, in theory, broad protection 
of the health and safety of clinical 
research subjects. In order to approve 
research proposals, IRBs must ensure: (1) 
risks to subjects are minimized by using 
viable research design; (2) anticipated 
benefits reasonably outweigh risks to 
subjects; (3) choice of research subject 
population is justified and valid, and 
vulnerable populations are not being 
taken advantage of; (4) informed consent 
will be obtained; (5) informed consent 
will be officially documented; (6) data 
collection monitoring techniques will 
ensure the safety or research subjects, 
and (7) subject privacy is ensured and 
data is kept confidential.8 9 Furthermore, 
additional precautionary measures will 
be taken to ensure ethical research 
protocol if the research population is 
"vulnerable to coercion or undue 
influence, such as children, prisoners, 
pregnant women, mentally disabled 
persons, or economically or educationally 
disadvantaged persons." 9 0 
When clinical research was still 
done primarily in the U.S., these 
regulations for the most part effectively 
protected trial subjects, ensured the 
scientific validity of research protocol, 
and verified the accuracy of trial data. 9 1 
But as sponsors began to submit foreign 
trial data, the FDA had to scramble to 
adapt methods of supervision. The FDA 
8 9 Criteria for I R B A p p r o v a l of Research , 21 C.F.R. 
§ 56 .111 (2001) . 
9 0 Ibid. 
9 1 D o m i n g u e z - U r b a n , " H a r m o n i z a t i o n in the 
Regulat ion of P h a r m a c e u t i c a l R e s e a r c h and 
H u m a n Rights: T h e N e e d to T h i n k Globally." 
gives sponsors conducting clinical trials 
abroad two options. First, they may 
submit an Investigational New Drug 
Application (IND) and be supervised by 
an IRB, just as they would be required to 
if the research were conducted in the U.S. 
An IND must contain pharmacological and 
chemical information about the drug, the 
objectives and duration of the clinical 
trial, background information on previous 
human and animal testing, foreign 
investigational or marketing experience, 
and manufacturing information. 9 2 It must 
also include a comprehensive outline for 
the clinical investigation, detailing the 
motivation behind the study, the 
components being studied, names and 
qualifications of all clinical investigators, 
research methodology, detailed protocols 
and procedures, the number of subjects to 
be enrolled, any anticipated risks and side 
effects, and information on the drug's 
safety and effectiveness based on 
previous studies. 9 3 
The second option is the most 
commonly used - the clinical trials must 
be done in accordance with the 
Declaration of Helsinki, or the regulations 
of the host country, whichever provides 
more extensive protections of the 
research subjects. 9 4 If host country 
guidelines are used, the clinical 
investigator must explain the differences 
between the standards used and those 
put forth by the Declaration of Helsinki, 
and their reasoning in choosing those 
guidelines. To gain premarket approval 
based only on foreign clinical data 
requires that the data is relevant to U.S. 
markets and medical practices, the 
9 2 Invest igat ional N e w D r u g Appl icat ion , 21 § 
3 1 2 . 2 3 (2002) . 
9 3 Ibid. 
9 4 R e s e a r c h c o n d u c t e d outside the United S t a t e s , 
21 C.F.R. § 8 1 4 . 1 5 (1986) . 
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clinical investigators are competent, and 
the understanding that the FDA may 
conduct on-site inspections if deemed 
necessary. 9 5 However, the FDA is often 
not aware that a clinical trial is being 
conducted abroad until the drug 
application is being submitted for market 
approval, after the completion of 
research, preventing field inspectors from 
supervising trial sites. 9 6 Foreign 
regulatory bodies may also monitor and 
inspect trials, but they are not obligated 
to share information or collaborate with 
the FDA. 9 7 
The FDA is responsible for 
ensuring that these regulations are 
followed and is allowed to cooperate with 
foreign governments and agencies to 
"reduce the burden of regulation, 
harmonize regulatory requirements, and 
achieve appropriate reciprocal 
arrangements." 9 8 While this does not 
explicitly imply extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, it certainly necessitates some 
amount of inspection to ensure the 
validity of the scientific data that will be 
used to determine the safety and efficacy 
of that drug. In 199O, only 271 clinical 
trials were conducted abroad to develop 
drugs for American markets. But by 2OO8, 
the number of foreign trials escalated 
2,OOO%, to 6,485. 9 9 That same year, 80% 
of approved marketing applications for 
new drugs involved clinical data from 
9 5 Ibid. 
9 6 Daniel Levinson. "The F o o d and D r u g 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s Overs ight of Clinical Trials ." 
Office of the Inspector General . 2OO7. < 
http://oig .hhs .gov/oei/reports/oei-O1-O6-
OO16O.pdf> 
9 7 L e v i n s o n , "The F D A ' s Overs ight of Clinical 
Trials ," 5. 
9 8 Interagency col laboration, 21 U.S.C. § 
393(c)(2OO9). 
9 9 L e v i n s o n , "The F D A ' s Overs ight of Clinical 
Trials ." 
foreign sites. The FDA inspected only 
1.9% of domestic trial sites and O.7% of 
foreign trial sites in 2OO8.1 O° Without 
conducting onsite inspections, the FDA 
cannot consistently and fully ensure that 
clinical investigators, sponsors, and 
independent review boards are adhering 
to the proper regulations while 
completing research. 
In many instances, a failure to 
adhere to ethical guidelines coincides 
with the falsification of data. For example, 
in 1995, South African researcher and 
professor Werner Bezwoda conducted 
clinical trials to test a new treatment on of 
women with Stage 4 (metastatic) breast 
cancer. 1 ( ) 1 In the 1999 meeting of the 
American Society of Clinical Oncology, he 
reported extremely favorable outcomes 
as a result of an expensive treatment of 
high-dose chemotherapy combined with 
bone marrow or stem cell transplants. 1 O 2 
When an on-site investigative team 
reviewed the trial data to verify Dr. 
Bezwoda's findings, they found 
"substantial evidence of scientific 
misconduct." 1 0 3 One-third of the trial 
subjects had not been officially enrolled 
and lacked any paperwork to verify their 
informed consent had been obtained or 
their eligibility to participate in the 
trial . 1 O S Many other patient files were 
incomplete or inconsistent with medical 
1 0 0 L e v i n s o n , "The F D A ' s Overs ight of Clinical 
Trials ," ii. 
1 0 1 R ichard Horton . "After B e z w o d a . " The Lancet 
355 (2OOO): 9 4 2 - 9 4 3 . 
1 0 2 Chr istopher W e i r and G o r d o n M u r r a y . "Fraud 
in clinical trials: Detect ing it and p r e v e n t i n g it." 
The Royal Statistical Society. D e c e m b e r 2O11. 
1 0 3 R a y m o n d B. W e i s s , Robert M. Rifkin, et al. 
"High-dose c h e m o t h e r a p y for high-risk p r i m a r y 
breast cancer: an on-site review of the B e z w o d a 
study." The Lancet 3 5 5 (2OOO): 999-1OO3. 
1 0 4 Ibid. 
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records. 1 0 5 Furthermore, Dr. Bezwoda 
never su;m<tted his research =rotoco> 0' 
s=onsor<ng un<vers<ty's Comm<ttee for 
Research on Human Subjects for rev<ew, 
and fa<>ed to re=ort three deaths that 
occurred as a resu>t of h<s treatment. 
Before Dr. Bezwoda's f<nd<ngs were 
d<s=roved, more than 30,000 Amer<can 
women o=ted for the =rocedure, wh<ch 
cost about $100,000 =er treatment. 1 0 6 
Ten to twenty =ercent d<ed after receiving 
the treatment, and the d<fference ;etween 
the surv<va> rates of those rece<v<ng the 
new thera=y com=ared to the standard 
treatment was negligible. 1 0 7 
The FDA's attem=t to divert 
res=onsi;ility, by requiring that 
researchers abide by the clinical 
regulations of the host country, is as 
ineffective as asking them to use their 
own judgment in making ethical 
decisions. Before 2005, the majority of 
African countries had no mechanisms in 
=lace to regulate clinical research at all, 
and those that did gave no authority to 
any one agency to a==rove, ins=ect, or 
terminate clinical trials if deemed 
noncom=liant with research standards. 1 0 8 
In 2007, 116 researchers were 
interviewed who were conducting trials 
in Sudan; it was revealed that 53 of them 
were oblivious to the existence of 
governmental ethical committees, which 
1 0 5 Ibid. 
1 0 6 T h o m a s H. M a u g h II and Rosie Mestel . "Key 
Breast Cancer S t u d y W a s a Fraud." Los Angeles 
Times. Apri l 27, 2 0 0 1 . 
1 0 7 Susan Dentzer . "A Quest ionable Cure: B o n e 
M a r r o w Transplants . " PBS. M a y 13, 1 9 9 9 . 
1 0 8 D. Maiga , B D A k a n m o r i , L. C h o c a r r o . 
"Regulatory oversight of clinical trials in Africa: 
p r o g r e s s over the past 5 years . " Vaccine 52 .27 
(2009) : 7 2 4 9 - 5 2 . 
< h t t p : / / w w w . n c ; i . n l m . n i h . g o v / p u ; m e d / 1 9 7 4 8 5 8 
0> 
had been established in Sudan in 1979. 1 0 9 
Because many African countries 
lack the infrastructure and resources to 
provide medical care to their citizens, in 
many cases the absence of regulation is 
deliberate. In efforts to supply their 
populations with health support and 
beneficial research, the governments of 
these nations often seek to attract 
pharmaceutical companies by stripping 
regulations and restrictions on research, 
or intentionally not enforcing them. 1 1 0 
Today, 40% or more clinical trials are 
taking place in Asia, Eastern Europe, and 
Latin America, where there are no 
required registry systems in place to keep 
track of the research conducted. 1 1 1 This 
makes it easy to exploit the lax regulation 
and minimal supervision. Research 
subjects from developing countries are 
also increasingly vulnerable due to the 
flexible informed consent guidelines of 
CIOMS, adjusted in an effort to cater to 
the communal realities that exist in parts 
of the developing world. Additionally, 
regional agreements fail to represent 
shared values and a streamlined system 
of regulation. 1 1 2 
In April 2008, the FDA 
announced that they would no longer 
require clinical research conducted 
1 0 9 D E Elsayed and NE Kass . " A s s e s s m e n t of the 
ethical r e v i e w p r o c e s s in Sudan." Developing 
World Bioethics 7.3 (2007) : 1 4 3 - 8 . 
1 1 0 B e n j a m i n M a s o n Meier . " International 
Protect ion of P e r s o n s U n d e r g o i n g Medical 
E x p e r i m e n t a t i o n : Protect ing the Right of I nformed 
Consent ." Berkeley Journal of International Law 
513.20 (2002) : 5 3 2 - 3 3 . 
1 1 1 K e y a A c h a r y a . "India: P r i m e Dest inat ion for 
Unethical Clinical Trails ." Inter Press Service. 
D e c e m b e r 14, 2 0 0 7 . 
< h t t p : / / w w w . c o m m o n d r e a m s . o r g / a r c h i v e / 2 0 0 7 / 
1 2 / 1 4 / 5 8 3 8 > 
1 1 2 M e i e r , " International Protect ion of P e r s o n s 
U n d e r g o i n g M e d i c a l E x p e r i m e n t a t i o n , " 534. 
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abroad to comply with the Declaration of 
Helsinki. Rather, they must follow the 
Guideline for Good Clinical Practice, a 
standard "for the design, conduct, 
performance, monitoring, auditing, 
recording, analysis, and reporting of 
clinical trials in a way that provides 
assurance that the data and reported 
results are credible and accurate, and that 
the rights, safety, and well-being of trial 
subjects are protected." 1 1 3 The motives 
behind the shift were based on the idea 
that GCP provides more specific 
instructions and guidelines on how to 
responsibly monitor the trials and report 
harmful incidences, as well as ensures 
data quality and reliability by 
necessitating the submission of detailed 
information regarding adherence to 
protocol. Furthermore, since the 
Declaration of Helsinki is a document that 
is international by nature and privy to 
change independent of FDA authority, 
future revisions might conflict with U.S. 
laws and regulations, and GCP avoids this 
potential conflict. 1 1 4 
The FDA is the oldest, and one of 
the most powerful, regulatory agencies in 
the U.S., wielding authority over almost a 
quarter of Gross National Product and 
supervising more than one trillion dollars 
worth of consumer goods and one-third 
of all imported products . 1 1 5 , 1 1 6 
Considering the vast number of economic 
and political interests affected by the 
practices of the FDA, the degree to which 
1 1 3 Foreign Clinical Studies Not C o n d u c t e d U n d e r 
an Invest igat ional N e w D r u g Appl icat ion . 21 C.F.R. 
§ 312.120 (2008) . 
114 
h t t p : / / w w w . r e g u l a t i o n s . g o v / # ! d o c u m e n t D e t a i l ; D 
= F D A - 2 0 0 4 - N - 0 0 6 1 - 0 0 0 2 ; o l d L i n k = f a l s e 
1 1 5 F o o d and D r u g A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . "Operat ions in 
a Global E n v i r o n m e n t . " 2 0 0 8 . 
1 1 6 Gardiner Harris . "The Safety Gap." The New 
York Times. O c t o b e r 31, 2 0 0 8 . 
they may influence policymaking and 
regulatory decisions requires 
examination. Capture theory, a model put 
forth by Samuel Huntington (1952) and 
Marver Bernstein (1955) in the 1950s, 
suggests that older and established 
members of industry are better able to 
make political connections, and thus more 
capable of influencing regulations that 
benefit them and restrict smaller f irms. 1 1 7 
The theory pertains to members of an 
industry sector whose dealings are 
affected by certain policy decisions, who 
then attempt to influence the process in 
pursuit of favorable policy outcomes. 
Regulatory capture occurs when these 
interest groups succeed in influencing 
public officials in "identifying with the 
interests of a client or industry." 1 1 8 There 
are two types of capture. The traditional 
form is "entry-barrier" capture, which 
strengthens regulation so that one section 
of industry is more privileged than the 
rest and market entry is more difficult. 
The other, more recently prevalent, form 
is called "corrosive" capture, which 
involves industry members pushing for 
deregulation and weaker enforcement. 1 1 9 
In recent years, industry capture 
1 1 7 Daniel P. Carpenter . "Protection w i t h o u t 
C a p t u r e : P r o d u c t A p p r o v a l b y a Polit ical ly 
R e s p o n s i v e , Learning Regulator ." American 
Political Science Review 98.4 (2004) : 6 1 3 . 
1 1 8 G a r y A d a m s , S h a r o n H a y e s , Stuart Weierter , 
John B o y d . "Regulatory C a p t u r e : M a n a g i n g the 
Risk." Austral ian Publ ic Sector A n t i - C o r r u p t i o n 
C o nf er enc e . Sydney, 2 0 0 7 . 
< h t t p : / / w w w . i c e a u s t r a l i a . c o m / a p s a c c 2 0 1 1 / p d f X p 
a p e r s 0 7 / d a y 1 _ 2 4 o c t 0 7 / S t r e a m A 2 / R e g u l a t o r y C a p 
t u r e M a n a g i n g T h e R i s k s _ J o h n B o y d . p d f > 
1 1 9 Daniel P. Carpenter . "Corrosive C a p t u r e ? T h e 
Duel ing Forces of A u t o n o m y and I n d u s t r y 
Inf luence in F D A P h a r m a c e u t i c a l Regulat ion." In 
Daniel C ar penter and David M o s s (Eds .) , 
Preventing Capture: Special Interest Influence in 
Regulation, and How to Limit It. T h e T o b i n Project , 
2 0 1 1 . 
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has shifted to the corrosive direction. In 
Washington, the eagerness to deregulate 
has resulted in lax consumer and 
environmental standards, freeing the 
private sector from government oversight 
of food safety, controls on greenhouse gas 
emissions, offshore drilling, and drinking 
water qual i ty . 1 2 0 , 1 2 1 Some argue that the 
promotion of the idea, "most regulation is 
unnecessary at best and downright 
harmful at worst," has reinforced the 
public's distrust of governmental 
involvement in industry, and 
delegitimized the idea of regulation itself. 
1 2 2 Dr. Marcia Angell, former editor-in-
chief of the New England journal of 
Medicine, wrote that the pharmaceutical 
industry specifically targets the FDA and 
exerts its influence by pushing legislation 
drafted by industry lobbyists, as well as 
through the administrative management 
of agencies "that are beholden to industry, 
and sometimes...openly hostile to the 
very idea of regulation."1 2" This has 
created a political environment in which 
agencies are pressured to cooperate with, 
rather than supervise, the industries they 
are obligated to regulate. 
As recently as a couple of decades 
ago, pharmaceutical companies relied on 
academic researchers and physicians to 
1 2 0 Jeffrey Smith . "A Last Push to Deregulate . " The 
Washington Post. O c t o b e r 31, 2 0 0 8 . 
1 2 1 D a n a Milbank. "Budget cuts as b a c k - d o o r 
regulation." The Washington Post. Apri l 2, 2 0 1 2 . 
1 2 2 J a m e s S u r o w i e c k i . "The Regulat ion Crisis ." The 
New Yorker. 2 0 1 0 . 
< h t t p : / / w w w . n e w y o r k e r . c o m / t a l k / f i n a n c i a l / 2 0 1 
0 / 0 6 / 1 4 / 1 0 0 6 1 4 t a _ t a l k _ s u r o w i e c k i > 
1 2 3 M a r c i a Angel l . "FDA: T h i s A g e n c y Can Be 
D a n g e r o u s . " R e v i e w of Reputation and Power: 
Organizational Image and Pharmaceutical 
Regulation at the FDA, b y Daniel Carpenter . T h e 
N e w Y o r k R e v i e w , 2 0 1 0 . 
< h t t p : / / w w w . a h r p . o r g / c m s / i m a g e s / s t o r i e s / a r t i c l 
e s / a n g e l l _ f d a _ d a n g e r o u s . p d f > 
conduct clinical drug trials. This reliance 
was based on the pharmaceutical 
companies' lack of expert staff and 
resources to design and execute the trials. 
Academic medical centers were able to 
supply their patients as research subjects, 
and the reputation of academic 
publications was needed to market the 
drugs. 1 2 4 But academic researchers, with 
many responsibilities (including teaching, 
research and patient care) in addition 
clinical drug trials, found it increasingly 
difficult to carry out trials and produce 
medicines at the rate pharmaceutical 
companies wanted. Academic research 
offices and institutional review boards 
continued to delay the commencement of 
trials due to their slow review process of 
proposals. A drug manufacturer, on 
average, loses $1.3 million every day a 
drug's FDA approval is delayed. 1 2 5 Once 
the pharmaceutical industry found that it 
was more cost effective to employ their 
own research physicians to design and 
oversee clinical trials much faster, their 
reliance on academia decreased 
considerably. 1 2 6 
Before 1980, the pharmaceutical 
industry had minimal influence on those 
who were recruited to research their 
products. Academic institutions that were 
paid to conduct studies had full 
responsibility and control over designing 
research procedure, analyzing and 
interpreting trial data, writing up results, 
and deciding where and how to report 
them. This allowed researchers and the 
institutions they worked for to have 
minimal ties to the companies that 
1 2 4 T h o m a s B o d e n h e i m e r . " U n e a s y A l l i a n c e — 
Clinical Invest igators and the P h a r m a c e u t i c a l 
Industry ." New England +ournal of Medicine 342 
(2000) : 1 5 3 9 - 1 5 4 4 . 
1 2 5 Ibid, 1540. 
1 2 6 Ibid, 1540. 
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sponsored them. Butrecently, 
pharmaceutical sponsors have 
strengthened their authority and input 
regarding product research; they often 
design the studies, analyze the data, write 
the report, and decide how and where to 
publish them. Recent studies have 
demonstrated that the industry's 
increased influence on the research of its 
products has created conditions in which 
sponsors may alter or frame trial data in 
order to make them appear safer and 
more effective. 1 2 7 While academic 
researchers had minimal financial ties to 
their sponsors before, now they often 
"serve as paid consultants and members 
of speakers' bureaus and advisory boards 
and sometimes even have equity interest 
in the companies." 1 2 8 Another study 
demonstrated that approximately two-
thirds of academic medical institutions 
hold equity interest in pharmaceutical 
companies that sponsor research in those 
institutions, two-thirds of medical school 
department chairs receive departmental 
income from drug companies, and three-
fifths receive personal income from those 
companies. 1 2 9 
In 1992, Congress passed the 
Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA), 
renewable every five years, which 
necessitates that pharmaceutical 
companies pay fees for regulation of their 
products. Companies pay around 
$300,000 to apply for drug approval, an 
annual fee of $145,000 for each 
manufacturing base, as well as a fee per 
product. 1 3 0 In return, the FDA must 
1 2 7 Marc ia Angel l . " Indust ry-Sponsored Clinical 
Research: A B r o k e n Sys t em. " JAMA 300 .9 (2008): 
1069-1071 . 
1 2 8 Ibid, 1070. 
1 2 9 Ibid, 1070. 
1 3 0 R a y M o y n i h a n . "Science, industry, and polit ics 
at the FDA." British Medical Journal 327 .160 
adhere to stricter approval deadlines and 
improve responsiveness to companies 
during the drug development process. 
The new law was passed to help the FDA 
accelerate its costly monitoring and 
reviewing operations. In the late 1980s, 
drug approval times averaged at 30 
months. In 1999, the median approval 
time was 11.6 months. 1 3 1 Marcia Angell, 
in her article "Taking Back the FDA," 
criticizes the law, which she says "puts 
the FDA on the payroll of the industry it 
regulates... [And] makes it more likely 
that drugs will be reviewed favorably." 1 3 2 
Smaller pharmaceutical companies are 
put at a disadvantage; one British 
producer protested that the new user fees 
were even greater than revenue from U.S. 
markets. 1 3 3 Although user fees increased 
over the years, faster approval times are 
financially beneficial to the industry in the 
long run—"if you pay $500,000 in user 
fees and get your [New Drug Application] 
approved one month earlier, you make 
more money... [It's] one of the few 
examples of paying the government an 
outrageous amount of money and you get 
back more than you pay." 1 3 4 In 2002, the 
FDA was estimated to receive $162 
million in user fees, which is nearly half 
the cost of reviewing drugs. 1 3 5 Because 
PDUFA is a renewable law and the FDA 
now relies so heavily on funding from 
(2003) . 
1 3 1 P u b l i c Cit izen. " P r o b l e m s in the N e w D r u g 
A p p r o v a l Process : A Case S t u d y of Lotronex ." 
2 0 1 0 . 
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Food We Eat. John W i l e y & Sons . (2005) : 152. 
1 3 4 Ibid, 152. 
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pharmaceutical companies, industry is in 
a prime negotiating position and can 
threaten to challenge the PDUFA renewal 
and withdraw funding. 
David Williams, in his 2001 
Pulitzer Prize-winning Los Angeles Times 
article, revealed that the FDA was 
mounting enormous pressure on its drug 
reviewers to work more quickly. An 
anonymous pharmacologist working in 
the FDA's scientific investigations division 
admitted, "the devil is in the details, and 
detail is something we no longer have the 
time to go into." 1 3 6 William Schultz, the 
FDA deputy commissioner from 1995¬ 
1999, explained: "You can meet the goal 
by either approving the drug or denying 
the approval. But there are some who 
argue that what Congress really wanted 
was not just decisions, but approvals. 
That is what really gets dangerous." 1 3 7 
Kathleen Holcombe, a former FDA 
legislative affairs staffer and 
congressional aide, pointed out that while 
historically, the FDA operated according 
to the motto, "'Regulate, be tough, enforce 
the law, and don't let one thing go 
wrong,'" the FDA more recently "sees 
itself much more in a cooperative role" 
with the pharmaceutical industry. 1 3 8 
In 1998, Public Citizen, a nonprofit, 
consumer rights advocacy group, 
surveyed FDA Medical Officers in charge 
of reviewing drug applications and found 
that out of the fifty-three who responded 
to the survey, nineteen officers recalled 
twenty-seven market-approved drugs 
1 3 6 David W i l l m a n . " H o w a N e w Policy Led to 
Seven D e a d l y Drugs ." Los Angeles Times. 
D e c e m b e r 20, 2 0 0 0 . 
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1 3 7 Ibid. 
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they believed should not have been 
approved. A study done in 2005, by 
Edmund Pezalla, revealed that that more 
than 51% of market-approved drugs may 
have had severe adverse effects that went 
undetected before approval. 1 3 9 In 2009, 
the FDA recalled 1,742 prescription 
medications from the market, growing 
309% from just 426 in 2008. 1 4 0 
Most criticism directed at the FDA 
rests on its perceived inability to 
efficiently respond to the safety concerns 
surrounding already approved drugs and 
their failure in post marketing safety 
surveillance. This is perhaps due to the 
FDA's lack of "clear and effective 
processes for making decisions about, and 
providing management oversight of, post 
market safety issues." 1 4 1 Dr. David 
Graham, an epidemiologist working as the 
Associate Director of the FDA's Office of 
Drug Safety, condemned the FDA for 
dealing with safety concerns in a perverse 
way that makes consumer welfare a 
peripheral responsibility. He wrote that 
the FDA refuses to act on safety concerns 
and alarming evidence during the 
preapproval process that may point to 
potential complications unless there is 
"complete certainty" of an increased risk 
due to the medication. This practice fails 
to protect consumers, is partial to 
industry interests, "rewards drug 
companies for not aggressively pursuing 
safety questions, and guarantees that 
1 3 9 E d m u n d Pezalla . "Prevent ing adverse drug 
react ions in the general populat ion ." Managed 
Care Interface 18.10 (2005) : 4 9 - 5 2 . 
1 4 0 Parija Kavi lanz . " D r u g Recal ls Surge." CNN 
Money. A u g u s t 2 0 1 0 . 
1 4 1 B M Psaty , SP B u r k e . "Protect ing the health of 
the public : Institute of M e d i c i n e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n 
on drug safety." New England Journal of Medicine 
3 5 5 . 1 7 (2006) : 1 7 5 3 - 5 . 
< h t t p : / / w w w . n c b i . n l m . n i h . g o v / p u b m e d / 1 7 0 3 0 8 4 
3> 
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some drugs with major safety problems 
will be approved, and, once approved, will 
remain on the market, even in the face of 
extensive patient harm." 1 4 2 This serves as 
evidence that the FDA is more interested 
in getting drugs on the market, rather 
than thoroughly evaluating the drugs, 
especially once they have already been 
market-approved. 1 4 3 
In a report prepared for Rep. 
Henry Waxman in 2006 by the Committee 
on Government Reform, the FDA's 
enforcement record was examined over 
the course of a 15-month investigation. 
The Committee reported that FDA 
enforcement in every sector had declined 
by over 50% since 2000, during the Bush 
Administration. 1 4 4 The FDA issued 50% 
less warning letters for regulation 
infringements, and confiscated 44% less 
mislabeled, defective, or dangerous 
products. Furthermore, FDA officials 
failed to act on the recommendations of 
agency field inspectors reporting 
violations in 138 cases. The report also 
mentioned the decline in FDA 
enforcement was not a result of 
manufacturers' increased level of 
adherence to regulation, and that FDA 
field inspectors found no decrease in 
1 4 2 Russel l G. T h o r n t o n . " P r e e m p t i o n , tort reform, 
and p h a r m a c e u t i c a l c la ims." Baylor University 
Medical Center 21.1 (2008) : 8 2 - 9 2 . 
< h t t p : / / w w w . n c b i . n l m . n i h . g o v / p m c / a r t i c l e s / P M C 
2 1 9 0 5 5 9 / > 
1 4 3 Jerry A v o r n . "Paying for D r u g A p p r o v a l s -
W h o ' s Using W h o m ? " New England Journal of 
Medicine 356 ( 2 0 0 7 ) : 1 6 9 7 - 1 7 0 0 . 
< h t t p : / / w w w . n e j m . o r g / d o i / f u l l / 1 0 . 1 0 5 6 / N E J M p 
0 7 8 0 4 1 > 
1 4 4 C o m m i t t e e on G o v e r n m e n t R e f o r m , Special 
Invest igat ions Division. "Prescription for H a r m : 
T h e Decl ine in F D A E n f o r c e m e n t Activity." June 
2006. <http://oversight-
a r c h i v e . w a x m a n . h o u s e . g o v / d o c u m e n t s / 2 0 0 6 0 6 2 
7 1 0 1 4 3 4 - 9 8 3 4 9 . p d f > 
violations from years before. 1 4 5 In 
response to these statistics, Dr. Jerry 
Avorn, an expert consultant, 
characterized the FDA as "an agency 
unwilling to exert its regulatory authority 
in defense of the public's health." 1 4 6 The 
only measure of FDA enforcement that 
increased in the five-year span was the 
number of drug recalls. In 2000, 3,716 
FDA-regulated drugs were recalled. In 
2005, the number of recalls increased by 
44%, to 5,338. 1 4 7 This increase indicates 
the FDA's serious neglect of adequate pre-
approval measures. 
Dr. Sidney Wolfe, Director of 
Public Citizen's Health Research Group 
for more than thirty years, laments the 
unprecedented rise of health 
complications and deaths due to unsafe 
prescription drugs, emphasizing the 
number of clear warning signs that 
surface before and immediately after 
unsafe drugs come on the market. "In all 
cases, once they came on the market, 
there was a very dangerous and reckless 
slowness to respond to the signals that 
came after marketing." 1 4 8The failures of 
the pre-approval phase as well as of the 
post-market safety surveillance phase 
contribute to delays in pulling drugs off 
the market - delays that cost thousands of 
lives. The U.S., compared to other first 
world countries like France and the 
United Kingdom, has an ineffective 
system of reporting adverse events of 
prescription drugs. Dr. Wolfe 
approximates that only between 1-10% of 
adverse reactions from prescription 
1 4 5 Ibid, i. 
1 4 6 Letter from Dr. Jerry A v o r n to Representat ive 
H e n r y A. W a x m a n (May 2 5 , 2 0 0 6 ) . 
1 4 7 C o m m i t t e e on G o v e r n m e n t R e f o r m , Special 
Invest igat ions Divis ion , "Prescription for H a r m : 
T h e Decl ine in F D A E n f o r c e m e n t Activity," 9. 
1 4 8 S i d ney W o l f e interview. 
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drugs are reported to the FDA. This 
increases the time it takes to pull the drug 
from the market or enforce a black box 
warning. 1 4 9 Dr. Wolfe goes on to claim 
that post-market surveillance analyses 
are often received poorly or with hostility 
by FDA officials, who "are wedded to the 
idea that when they approved the drug, it 
must have been OK or we wouldn't have 
approved it... [They] tend to take very, 
very negatively the criticism that comes 
from those people that do post-market 
surveillance." 1 5 0 
Jim Dickinson, an established 
columnist and the editor of FDA Review, 
has tracked FDA policy developments and 
deregulatory shifts for the past three 
decades, wrote in 2010: 
"It has taken almost a 
generation, but by now, the 
pro-industry infiltration of 
FDA's culture is firmly 
entrenched. Not only is 
collaboration in product 
reviews officially 
encouraged, but good 
relationships across the 
regulatory fence hold the 
prospect of a possible 
future career in a well-paid 
industry job - a connection 
that is less likely to be 
publicly noticed in news 
media that now have to line 
up for information that has 
been filtered through 
agency press offices. The 
arm's-length relationship 
that formerly ruled every 
contact between agency 
and industry has become a 
1 4 9 Ibid. 
1 5 0 Ibid. 
fading memory." 1 5 1 
The FDA and pharmaceutical 
industry collaborate in other harmful 
ways - a phenomenon dubbed "the 
revolving door," which occurs in every 
regulatory agency and level of 
government. Many FDA employees find 
themselves working as consultants for 
pharmaceutical companies after their 
stint at the agency. 1 5 2 This is a concern 
especially when drug reviewers, still 
employed by the FDA, but looking to 
apply for jobs at large pharmaceutical 
companies in the near future, are hesitant 
to give unfavorable reviews. The Center 
for Responsive Politics published a report 
in 2006 listing fifty-three individuals who 
at one time worked for various 
government agencies, and had either 
before or afterwards worked for a private 
sector employer in the health industry. 1 5 3 
Billy Tauzin, a member of the House of 
Representatives (1980-2005) and the 
Chairman of the House Energy & 
Commerce Committee, which was highly 
influential in drafting the Medicare drug 
benefit, went on to become the President 
of the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) in 
2005. 1 5 4 Michael Friedman, the Acting 
Commissioner of the FDA (1997-1998), 
1 5 1 Merri l l G o o z n e r . " F D A M o r e Pro Industry than 
A n y T i m e in 35 Y e a r s . " T h e Health Care Blog. 
J a n u a r y 16, 2 0 1 0 . 
1 5 2 H a w t h o r n e , Inside the FDA: The Business and 
Politics Behind the Drugs We Take and the Food We 
Eat, 150 . 
1 5 3 C o n s u m e r Project on T e c h n o l o g y . "Revolving 
door b e t w e e n the U.S. G o v e r n m e n t and Industry." 
February , 2006. 
< h t t p : / / w w w . c p t e c h . o r g / i p / h e a l t h / p o l i t i c s / r e v o l 
v i n g d o o r . h t m l > 
1 5 4 W i l l i a m M. W e l c h . "Tauzin switches sides f r o m 
drug industry o v er seer to lobbyist ." USA Today. 
D e c e m b e r 15, 2004. 
< h t t p : / / w w w . u s a t o d a y . c o m / m o n e y / i n d u s t r i e s / h 
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later became the Senior Vice President of 
the Pharmacia Corporation, and PhRMA's 
Chief Medical Officer for Biomedical 
Preparedness. 1 5 5 Gerald J. Mossinghoff, 
the former Assistant Secretary of 
Commerce and Commissioner of Patents 
and Trademarks from 1981-1985, 
became a registered lobbyist for PhRMA 
in 1998. Susan K. Finston, who formerly 
worked at the State Department in the 
Office of Intellectual Property and 
Competition, now works as the Assistant 
Vice President for Intellectual Property 
and Middle East/African Affairs at 
PhRMA. Edward Allera, the Associate 
Chief Councel for Enforcement at the FDA 
from 1974-1978, later became a partner 
at a law firm with clientele including 
Pfizer and PhRMA, and a lobbyist for 
Johnson T Johnson in 1998. These are 
only a few examples of high-level state 
officials who later would go on to work 
for the very industry they worked for 
years to regulate. 
Daniel Carpenter, a professor of 
government at Harvard, published a study 
in 2002 in which he reviewed 450 drugs 
approved by the FDA between 1977 and 
2000. He concluded that the most 
prominent sources of influence were "the 
number of times a disease was mentioned 
in The Washington Post, the budget of the 
Center for Drugs, and the budgets of 
patient advocacy groups." 1 5 6 In other 
words, FDA approval rates are spurred by 
public pressure and available resources. 
Although Carpenter's study did not look 
at industry influence, he admitted, "Firm 
attributes undoubtedly sway the FDA's 
decision making in drug approval 
1 5 5 "Michael A. F r i e d m a n : Profile." Forbes. 
< h t t p : / / p e o p l e . f o r b e s . c o m / p r o f i l e / m i c h a e l - a -
f r i e d m a n / 6 8 5 0 7 > 
1 5 6 H a w t h o r n e , Inside the FDA, 154. 
cases." 1 5 7 Also, the pharmaceutical 
industry is known to make direct 
contributions and giving support to 
patient advocacy groups, which are often 
the parties that attract media attention. 
Carpenter also studied the bias 
against small companies that permeates 
the approval process. It is an accepted 
fact that large, established companies face 
fewer obstacles in obtaining drug 
approval. Carpenter studied 766 drugs 
submitted between 1979 and 2000, and 
analyzed review times, political 
contributions from companies, the 
ownership of companies, and the budgets 
of patient advocacy groups. He found that 
large companies often complete the 
approval process much faster. After a 15-
month review process, more than 40% of 
products submitted by large companies 
were approved while only 15% of 
products from small companies were 
given approval. He attributed this to "the 
greater regulator familiarity that large 
firms enjoy," explaining that having a 
prior relationship with the agency can 
result in a 55% advantage in approval 
t imes. 1 5 8 
To illustrate how the FDA 
appeases the pharmaceutical industry in 
regulatory practice, I will take closer look 
at the development, approval process, 
and post marketing surveillance 
measures of a drug called Lotronex. This 
case study epitomizes the FDA's heavy 
reluctance to act on the recommendations 
of its drug reviewers and in the best 
interest of the consumer population, 
1 5 7 Ibid, 158. 
1 5 8 D a n i e l C a r p e n t e r , Br ian Feinstein , Col in M o o r e , 
et al. " W h y D o Bigger F i r m s Receive Faster D r u g 
A p p r o v a l s ? " Harvard Medical School. (2004) : 29. 
< h t t p : / / p e o p l e . h m d c . h a r v a r d . e d u / ~ d c a r p e n t / w h 
ybigfast1 .pdf> 
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prioritizing industry interests over safety 
concerns. 
In July 1999, GlaxoWellcome (now 
GlaxoSmithKline) submitted a New Drug 
Application for Alosetron (Lotronex), a 
drug developed to treat irritable bowel 
syndrome in women. Irritable bowel 
syndrome is not a fatal condition, but 
Lotronex was given an accelerated 
review. Although 27% of the women in 
the clinical trial experienced constipation 
and 10% had to withdraw from the study, 
Glaxo labeled constipation an "infrequent 
side effect," even though constipation can 
cause severe complications in women 
with IBS . 1 5 9 The medical officer reviewing 
the drug noticed that there were four 
cases of ischemic colitis, a serious and 
rare condition, which occurred in the 
experimental group during the trials. 1 6 0 
The review noted that this "[represents] a 
signal of a potentially serious problem 
that should be anticipated, perhaps even 
more severely expressed, if the drug is 
approved for clinical use ." 1 6 1 Despite the 
fact that only 10-20% of trial subjects 
reported improvement due to Lotronex 
and women in one trial group reported a 
level of relief between 0.12-0.14 (on a 
scale of 0-4) higher than women in the 
1 5 9 S idney W o l f e , M.D., Director of Public Citizen s 
Health R e s e a r c h G r o u p , in t e s t i m o n y before the 
U.S. Food & Drug A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s 
Gastrointest inal D r u g s A d v i s o r y C o m m i t t e e and 
the Drug Safety and Risk M a n a g e m e n t 
S u b c o m m i t t e e of the A d v i s o r y C o m m i t t e e for 
P h a r m a c e u t i c a l Science, Apri l 23 , 2 0 0 2 . 
1 6 0 Public Citizen's Health R e s e a r c h G r o u p , 
"Petition to the F o o d and D r u g A d m i n i s t r a t i o n to 
r e m o v e Lotronex from the market ," Publication 
# 1 5 3 3 ; A u g u s t 31 , 2 0 0 0 . 
1 6 1 John R. Senior, M.D. , "FDA Medical Review: 
Lotronex , N D A 2 1 - 1 0 7 , 9 0 - D a y Safety U p d a t e " 
N o v e m b e r 30, 1999, p. 22 . 
placebo group, the drug was approved in 
February of 2 0 0 0 . 1 6 2 , 1 6 3 Less than two 
months later, a multitude of adverse 
events were reported, including eight 
cases of ischemic colitis and six 
hospitalizations. 1 6 4 The FDA reconvened 
to review its decision, attempting to label 
Lotronex with a black box warning. Glaxo 
protested, and they agreed instead to 
include a Medication Guide with each 
prescription to describe symptoms of 
dangerous side effects. 1 6 5 But by 
November, five patients were dead and 
there were many more reports of adverse 
effects. 1 6 6 
In November 2000, FDA Medical 
Officers rejected Glaxo's risk management 
proposals and insisted, "the sponsor has 
not identified a subset of women who will 
respond to Lotronex therapy safety... a 
risk management plan cannot be 
successful that will eliminate deaths, 
colectomies, ischemic colitis, and 
complications of treatment that were 
never seen previously in the management 
1 6 2 Joseph S h a p i r o , "A pill t u r n e d bitter: H o w a 
q u e s t for a b l o c k b u s t e r drug w e n t fatally 
w r o n g , " U.S. News & World Report, V o l . 129, Issue: 
23: D e c e m b e r 11, 2 0 0 0 . 
1 6 3 Public Citizen's Health R e s e a r c h G r o u p , 
"Petition to the F o o d and D r u g A d m i n i s t r a t i o n to 
r e m o v e Lotronex from the market ," Publication 
# 1 5 3 3 ; A u g u s t 31 , 2 0 0 0 . 
1 6 4 Ibid. 
1 6 5 Ibid. 
1 6 6 D e p a r t m e n t of Health and H u m a n Services . 
Lotronex ( a l o s e t r o n ) safety and risk m a n a g e m e n t 
s u m m a r y . M e m o r a n d u m P I D [ D 0 0 0 6 7 4 , 16 
N o v e m b e r 2 0 0 0 . 
< w w w . c i t i z e n . o r g / d o c u m e n t s / 1 5 6 6 . p d f > 
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of IBS." 1 6 7 Despite this, the FDA proposed 
the "restricted distribution" of Lotronex, 
although Glaxo opted to pull Lotronex 
from the market, having already made 
$56 million off the drug. 1 6 8 
In response to a public outcry and 
patients' willingness to accept the risks 
associated with Lotronex, Glaxo applied 
to re-market the drug in December of 
2OO1. Although safety reviewers 
emphasized, "potentially everyone who 
takes Lotronex is at risk," the FDA 
advisory committee reapproved the drug 
in 2OO2, under the condition that the 
dosage would be halved and restricted to 
patients who had exhausted traditional 
forms of treatment. 1 6 9 As a result of his 
experience, Dr. Paul Stolley, who joined 
the FDA in 2OOO as a senior consultant 
assigned to examine the post marketing 
safety of Lotronex, went on to become a 
contributing staff member at Public 
Citizen, a consumer advocacy group. He 
spoke out against the FDA, which he 
called "a servant of industry," after the re-
approval of Lotronex: "I think it's a shame 
how it has fallen down on the job, and 
Lotronex is a perfect example. The FDA 
1 6 7 Kathleen Uhl , Zili Li, A n n Corken M a c k e y , and 
Paul Stolley. "Lotronex Safety & Risk M a n a g e m e n t 
S u m m a r y . " FDA. Center for Drug Evaluat ion and 
Research . Apri l 2 3 , 2OO2. 
<http: / / w w w . f d a . g o v / o h r m s / d o c k e t s / a c / O 2 / b r i e 
f i n g / 3 8 4 8 B 1 _ O 2 _ F D A % 2 O L o t r o n e x . p d f > 
1 6 8 U.S. F o o d and D r u g A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , "Glaxo 
W e l l c o m e Decides to W i t h d r a w Lotronex from the 
Market ," Talk p a p e r : TOO-65; N o v e m b e r 28, 2OOO. 
1 6 9 D e p a r t m e n t of H e a l t h and H u m a n Services , 
F o o d and D r u g A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , Center for Drug 
Evaluat ion and Research . Gastrointest inal D r u g s 
A d v i s o r y C o m m i t t e e and D r u g Safety and Risk 
M a n a g e m e n t S u b c o m m i t t e e of the A d v i s o r y 
C o m m i t t e e for P h a r m a c e u t i c a l S c i e n c e , 23 Apri l 
2OO2. 
< w w w . f d a . g o v / o h r m s / d o c k e t s / a c / O 2 / t r a n s c r i p t s 
/ 3 8 4 8 T 1 . p d f > 
was in partnership with industry. It 
should have been negotiating, not in 
partnership. Why was it in partnership? 
Because it's financially supported by 
industry." 1 7 O 
CONCLUSIONS 
The era of globalization has 
facilitated the emergence of a new set of 
global health problems that challenge the 
traditionally unilateral and domestic 
approaches of state efforts. Regulatory 
agencies like the FDA are no longer able 
to fully address the public health threats 
that endanger their populations or the 
jurisdictional limitations that hinder their 
regulatory authority. The globalization of 
clinical research necessitates an 
expansion of ethical oversight. 
International codes of conduct contribute 
important substantive standards, but lack 
legal enforcement mechanisms, and fail to 
be widely implemented due to the 
absence of competent regulatory agencies 
in many parts of the developing world. 
The FDA has enormous potential to 
protect research subjects and enforce 
ethical standards due to its position as the 
gatekeeper to the most profitable market 
for prescription drugs in the world. In 
2OO5, the U.S. spent more on prescription 
drugs than Australia, Canada, Germany, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United 
Kingdom combined. 1 7 1 With this level of 
influence, any improvement in the FDA's 
regulatory efficacy would be valuable in 
1 7 0 R a y M o y n i h a n . "Alosetron: a case study in 
regulatory c a p t u r e , or a v ictory for p a t i e n t s ' 
r ights?" British Medical Journal 325 (2OO2): 592¬ 
5 9 5 . 
< h t t p : / / w w w . n c b i . n l m . n i h . g o v / p m c / a r t i c l e s / P M C 
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1 7 1 S. M o r g a n and J. K e n n e d y , Prescript ion D r u g 
Accessibi l i ty and Affordabi l i ty in the United States 
and A b r o a d , T h e C o m m o n w e a l t h F u n d , June 2O1O. 
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ensuring ethical and technical clinical 
compliance internationally. 
But as much as agency capacity is 
limited by resources, international 
collaboration, and jurisdictional 
limitations, it is even more profoundly 
debilitated by industry interests. As I 
have demonstrated, FDA control has been 
gutted by a complex process of industry 
capture. In a political climate brimming 
with anti-regulatory opinion, conflicts of 
interest are becoming more and more 
embedded into agency structure: the 
revolving door between industry and 
agency, and the Prescription Drug User 
Fee Act increasingly put regulators at 
odds with their duties. In order to pursue 
the expansion of regulatory oversight 
both domestically and abroad, industry 
influence must be limited. To prevent the 
occurrence of the revolving door 
paradigm, stringent conflict of interest 
laws must be implemented to restrict 
former high-ranking FDA officials from 
becoming pharmaceutical company board 
members. In the interest of consumer 
safety, the FDA should enforce and 
enhance post market safety surveillance, 
and expedite drug recalls when 
significant reports of adverse effects first 
emerge. Continued apathetic inaction 
regarding the industry's influence on 
pharmaceutical regulation is a gross 
disregard for consumer safety and 
research subject welfare. 
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